Michel Rosenfeld: Democracia constitucional e Estado de direito

Leia artigo de Michel Rosenfeld sobre a democracia constitucional e as exigências do Estado de direito.

Pontos de destaque:

O ESTADO DE DIREITO: In the broadest terms, the rule of law requires that the state only subject the citizenry to publicly promulgated laws, that the state’s legislative function be separate from the adjudicative function, and that no one within the polity be above the law. The three essential characteristics of modern constitutionalism are limiting the powers of government, adherence to the rule of law, and protection of fundamental rights. In the absence of the rule of law, contemporary constitutional democracy would be impossible. QUE CONSENSO SE PODE ESPERAR NUMA SOCIEDADE PLURALISTA: According to Habermas, the legitimacy of law can be established dialogically through communicative action among persons who recognize one another as equals and who agree to accept as legitimate only those laws to which they would all consent, both to enact as autonomous legislators and to follow as law-abiding citizens. This test allows for reconstruction on the basis of a counterfactual in order to establish the legitimacy of law and is used by Habermas to elaborate and defend his “proceduralist paradigm of law.” I therefore propose to adapt Habermas’ test to account for this key difference. More specifically, I intend to rely on two modifications which somewhat weaken the conditions of legitimacy envisaged by Habermas: 1) I will consider the counterfactual requirement of self-legislation, coupled with willing submission to law, to be satisfied if it can be used to legitimate a rule of law regime taken as a whole without separately legitimating individual laws within that regime and 2) I will construe the requirement of consent more loosely so as to include within it a criterion of reasonableness based on lack of coercion, coupled with the meeting of certain conditions, which make it reasonable to endorse a particular rule of law regime consistent with one’s substantive aims. It follows from these considerations that actual unanimous consent for any meaningful constitutional constraints, let alone for any rule of law regime, seems highly implausible. Actual consent, however, is unnecessary. It is arguably sufficient for purposes of assessing the legitimacy of a rule of law regime to determine whether acceptance of the latter would be reasonably consistent with the diverse agendas of all concerned. RISCOS DE POLITIZAÇÃO DO DIREITO: Furthermore, so long as the line between judicial interpretation and judicial lawmaking remains blurred, there seems to be no cogent way to draw a plausible distinction between the rule of law and politics (p. 1337).

PUBLICIDADE DAS DECISÕES E DAS RAZÕES DE DECIDIR EVITA ABUSOS JUDICIAIS: to the extent that judicial decisions must be made public and the reasons for such decisions revealed in published opinions, the likelihood of blatant judicial abuses seems rather remote (p. 1340). CORREÇÃO DOS EXCESSOS DA MAIORIA E REFORÇAR A DEMOCRACIA: According to this view, the function of the Constitution and of judicial review is to provide the necessary legal basis for a well-functioning democracy. Consistent with this, besides protecting democracy from its traditional enemies, the Constitution is meant to insulate the democratically generated legal order against majoritarian excesses and pathologies. In this context, process based guarantees become part and parcel of the rule of law through imposition of procedural constraints on the generation and application of majority-based legal rules (p.1340)

ROSENFELD, Michel. The Rule of Law and the Legitimacy of Constitutional Democracy". Southern California Law Review, v. 74, 2001, p.1307-1351

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